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The article analyses the sociocultural context and factors of the initial 
shaping and further evolution of the image of a German as perceived by Russian 
army soldiers during World War I (1914 – February 1917). The article reveals 
the specific role and characteristics of the official propaganda used to create 
the image of the German enemy and its reflection within a soldier’s perception. 
The author examines verbal and nonverbal symbolic representations of the 
image of a German in a soldier’s consciousness and the correlation between 
the image of a German, the enemy from outside and the “inner German”. The 
author’s interpretation of published and unpublished sources both of official 
and personal nature (materials from the police department, statistics, folklore, 
memoires, letters, diaries, periodicals) is underpinned by the conceptual 
techniques of imagology and sociocultural history. The author reveals the key 
characteristics and the evolutionary development of the image of the German 
enemy in popular perceptions of Russian army soldiers between 1914–1917.
K e y w o r d s:  patriotic propaganda, Russian army, soldiers, Germany, 
lubok1, German, “inner German”, enemy image, enemy image evolution.
Статья посвящена анализу социокультурного контекста, факторов 
формирования и эволюции образа немца в сознании солдат русской 
армии в условиях Первой мировой войны. Показаны специфические 
черты и роль официальной патриотической пропаганды в формировании 
образа немца-врага, ее преломление в восприятии солдат. Рассмотрены 
вербальные и невербальные символические репрезентации образа 
немца в сознании солдат, корреляция образов  немца - внешнего врага  и 
«внутреннего немца». На основе концептуальных подходов имагологии 
и социокультурной истории интерпретируются опубликованные и 
1  A lubok (plural Lubki, Cyrillic: Russian: лубок, лубочная картинка) is a Russian po-
pular print, characterized by simplegraphics and narratives derived from literature, religious 
stories and popular tales. Lubki prints were used as decoration in houses and inns. Early 
examples from the late 17th and early 18th centuries were woodcuts, then engravings or et-
chings were typical, and from the mid-19th century lithography. They sometimes appeared 
in series, which might be regarded as predecessors of the modern comic strip. Cheap and 
simple books, similar to chapbooks, which mostly consisted of pictures, are called lubok lit-
erature or (Cyrillic: Russian: лубочная литература). Both pictures and literature are com-
monly referred to simply as lubki. The Russian word lubok derives from lub – a special type 
of board that pictures were printed on. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lubok
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неопубликованные источники официального и личного происхождения 
(материалы Департамента полиции, статистика, фольклор, воспоминания, 
письма, дневники, периодическая печать).  Выявлены основные черты 
и направленность эволюции образа немца-врага в массовом сознании 
солдат русской армии в указанный период.
Ключевые слов а: патриотическая пропаганда, русская армия, 
солдаты, Германия, лубок, немец, «внутренний немец», образ врага, 
эволюция образа врага.
Studying the sociocultural history of World War I in the West in the last 
three decades resulted in the publication of a number of papers on its dif-
ferent aspects, including issues of mutual perceptions between adversaries 
[Hubertus, 1995; Stites; Liulevicius; Lipp; Norris; Ziemann; etc.]. Studies 
like these in Russia only started in the post-soviet time when emphases 
have shifted from revealing the preconditions for the revolution to the ex-
amination of cultural and social practices of wartime. Papers published by 
S. V. Tyutyukin, Yu. I. Kiryanov, E. S. Senyavskaya, B. I. Kolonitsky etc., 
demonstrate a decisive move towards the re-evaluation of cultural and psy-
chological aspects of Russia’s part in the First World War. The nature of 
patriotic attitudes, the psychology of the front line and rear, and the system 
of beliefs and perceptions conditioned by the involvement in the war have 
become subjects of specialized studies [Тютюкин; Кирьянов; Сенявская, 
1999; Колоницкий, 1999, etc.]. Assiduous attention to the range of prob-
lems pertaining to imagology is a manifestation of the “cultural turn” in 
contemporary Russian historiography of World War I. The first papers on 
the image of the “alien” and enemy just before and during World War I were 
published in the 1990s [Сенявская, 1997; Сергеев]. Some monographic 
studies and articles, which consider the problems of national ideology and 
identity, public and individual perceptions of war, authority, enemies and 
allies of one’s own state in relation to World War I, were published at the be-
ginning of the 21st century [Поршнева; Сенявская, 2006; Носков, Коло-
ницкий, 2010; Голубев, Поршнева, etc.]. This subject is, however, far from 
having been exhausted and requires further research not only in previously 
unexamined sources but also with new interpretations of documentary evi-
dence introduced by scholars.
The image of adversaries and allies took shape in the Russian conscious-
ness just before the war as international relations deteriorated, creating two 
hostile blocs and establishing the ideological and psychological precondi-
tions for total war. S. Ferster argues convincingly that without the direct 
support of civil society the transition to this type of war, which left its im-
print on an entire era, would have been impossible [Ферстер, c. 25]. The 
national “I” as well as both the friendly and adversarial “Other” had be-
come more clearly defined at the turn of 19th and 20th centuries, establishing 
conditions for not only the emergence of coalitions of hostile nation-states 
but also the consolidation of the nation-state. At the time the mechanism 
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for shaping foreign political stereotypes was particularly active, not only 
through mass propaganda but also through the actualisation of perceived 
ethnic images and prejudices, cultural preferences and values. 
The specifics of Russia’s historical situation at the beginning of the 
20th century determined the ultimate weakness in influencing public 
perceptions with official “patriotic” propaganda and the ideological and 
psychological preparations for the war. This was determined by a number 
of factors: concerns for inadequate perception by the masses of the anti-
German propaganda, which should be capable of provoking a sufficiently 
volatile social response; the country being not quite ready for war due 
to the incomplete implementation of military technological reforms; 
the anticipation of possible tragic consequences of an unsuccessful war; 
Germanophile attitudes of a part of the Russian ruling elite and dynastic 
connections of the Russian Royal House; apprehension of promoting 
further the pan-Slavism attitudes; unsuccessful propaganda experiences 
of “police socialism”; distrust for the “public”, the intellectual forces which 
could have performed this work more efficiently [Stites, р.  9]. The pan-
Slavism propaganda that was not encouraged by the government did not 
match the examples of popular patriotism and was not oriented to the 
masses at large [Hubertus, 1991, р. 4]. 
The development of ideological substantiation for Russia’s participation 
in the war against the German bloc had begun after the country entered 
the conflict on the 19th of July 1914 and was promoted, similar to other 
countries, by insisting upon the protection of the homeland, its people, its 
vital interests and values against interference by other states. In his Imperial 
Manifestos dated 20 and 26 July 1914, declaring the war with Germany 
and Austria-Hungary, Nicholas II indicated the causes for and the nature 
of Russia’s participation in the European conflict: the protection of the 
country’s territory, its honour, dignity, position amongst other great states, 
as well as for “Slavic brothers of the same blood and the same faith” (“еди-
нокровных и единоверных братьев-славян”) [Царские слова к русско-
му народу, с. 1]2. 
On the whole the general mobilisation in Russia had been successful; 
96  % of those subject to conscription had appeared before mobilisation 
committees3. Before the general mobilisation, Russian armed forces 
counted 1,423,000 soldiers; after its completion and additional drafts by the 
end of 1914, this count increased to six and a half million recruits [Россия 
в мировой войне, с. 18]. Almost 75  % of all the conscripts at the time 
of the first week of the mobilisation were peasants [Berkevich, с. 13]. The 
proportion of peasants increased over time; by 1917, of the 15.5 million 
conscripts, over 12.8 million had been drafted from the countryside [Рос-
сия в мировой войне, с. 4, 49].
2  Tsar’s words to the Russian people.
3  The mobilisation was accompanied with some disturbances amongst the lower ranks 
predominantly in the form of trashing state-owned wine shops which was a reaction to the 
violation of the traditional conscript send-off ritual. See: [Поршнева, с. 91–94, 134–135].
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The attitude of Russian soldiers to the war, to enemies, and to allies 
of their state in many respects was determined by the particular and 
fundamental beliefs and perceptions of the peasants. Peasants, and a 
majority of workers, perceived war as fate, a trial sent by God, a natural 
disaster and impossible to counteract [Поршнева, с. 88–89, 133]. With 
the country’s impending engagement in war, the authoritarian, patriarchal 
political culture determined that the formula, “For Faith, Tsar and 
Fatherland”, closely connected to the traditional model of behaviour in the 
new conscripts. 
From the moment of Russia’s engagement in the war, the official 
propaganda shaped the external image of the enemy by employing all 
available means. Attention had been focused on the enemy’s culpability at 
the onset of war, demonstrating its unfair annexationist goals [Альбом ге-
роев войны, с. 2–5; Россия борется за правду, с. 6–11]. The provincial 
press was not far behind the main periodicals in cultivating an anti-
German pathos [Пермские ведомости; Оренбургская жизнь; Ураль-
ская жизнь]. There was broad propaganda outlining the “sacred struggle” 
of two opposing principles, slavism and germanism, in which the former 
represents “culture and the sacred truth” and the latter, brute force of the 
armoured fist. 
Projecting various negative stereotypes on the enemy is a psychological 
pattern for manufacturing the image of the enemy during wartime. The 
framework of perception, the psychological foundation for stereotypes, 
is the readiness to perceive a phenomenon or a subject in a certain way, 
making it fit a context or prior experience [Гасанов, с. 190]. Perception of 
Germany in Russia, affected by its growing military and economic power, 
had changed at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries; it started to be associ-
ated not with philosophy and culture as before, but rather with the nega-
tive connotations and traits of Prussian culture [Эрн, с. 373−374; Лакер, 
с. 60−77]. The attitude toward German people in Russian popular culture, 
established in 18th–19th centuries, remained unchanged until the beginning 
of the war. By the end of the 19th century, according to S. V. Obolenskaya, 
in popular culture the German remained mainly a comical figure, someone 
who could be easily defeated in combat [Оболенская, с. 178]. This am-
bivalent image of a German in the everyday perceptions of Russian people 
is demonstrated in proverbs recorded by V. I. Dal [Пословицы русского 
народа, с. 304]. 
There had been a traditional set of anti-German, anti-Austrian, and 
anti-Turkish ethnic stereotypes in the conventional perceptions of Russian 
people. These stereotypes were widespread and were adapted to the new 
conditions. The psychological mobilisation of the population and the army 
for fighting the external enemy had been occurring in the context of mili-
tary engagement, in part spontaneously but to a greater extent purposively. 
This had been achieved through the transferral of various negative stereo-
types onto the enemy, ultimately creating an image that dehumanizes. For 
instance, in the first six months of the war, about 600 various publications, 
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brimming with chauvinism, were printed in Russia with the total number 
of copies reaching 11 million [Булдаков, 1998, с. 23].
Official patriotic propaganda created a caricature of the German enemy, 
as pitiful, comic, too thrifty, too pedantic, etc. [Война и народ, с. 4−6; Смех 
и сатира, № 34−39]. There were two general and ridiculing depictions of 
“typical” Germans in various patriotic publications, most importantly in 
luboks: firstly, the Prussians, who were depicted as corseted, with mono-
cles and sharp-top tin hats, and secondly the Bavarians, who were depicted 
with large pot-bellies (due to their addiction to beer), sausages and clay 
pipes [Stites, р. 16]. These anti-German attitudes spread quickly and easily 
through negative images and stereotypes, R. Stites argues convincingly, be-
cause they were outlets for a latent anti-West perceptual framework in the 
Russian consciousness, shared both by common people and the elite [Ibid., 
р. 16–17]. In fact, for centuries in Russia the word for a German, nemets, 
had meant anybody from Western and Central Europe.
The Russian army’s main enemy had always been the German army. 
Germans had lived in Russia for hundreds of years and were known 
to Russians better than other groups of people. Further, there was a 
tradition of perceiving the German in folk culture, and Germans had used 
internationally prohibited practices and conventions to wage war against 
the Russian army. Each of the previous reasons converge to intensify 
negative stereotypes of the image of the German, which were embodied 
ultimately by the figure of Wilhelm II. He had been selected as the key 
target for mockery. Franz Joseph and the Sultan of Turkey took second and 
third place respectively [Хубертус, с. 383–385]. About 30 % of patriotic 
postcards exclusively depicted Wilhelm II; he was also the main antihero of 
comic luboks, in which the kaiser was presented as the representative of the 
entire nation [Там же, с. 384]. Wilhelm II had been depicted as the antichrist 
not only on lubok pictures, postcards, but also in cinematography; in the 
film, “Disgrace of the 20th Century or the Antichrist”, he was presented as 
a monster committing unthinkable crimes [Там же, с. 385]. The satirical 
kinoluboks, Mars’s Stepson, Napoleon Inside Out, Tale of a Sorry German 
Soldier etc., enjoyed broad popularity during the first part of the war [Гинз-
бург, с. 200]. “Lubok pictures and placards, of which millions of copies were 
distributed in 1914 and early 1915, were drafted in popular language and 
constructed following the folklore narrative that heroes always win, evil 
punished, the good triumphs and “the Russian spirit” prevails over dark 
forces” [Некрылова, с. 116]. 
Propaganda of this sort, which influenced the creation of the image 
of the German enemy in soldiers’ minds in the initial period of war, is 
corroborated by the existence of similar motifs in military folk poetry 
and World War I military songs [Солдатские песни, с. 7–16; Солдатские 
военные песни, с. 6–66]. Military soldiers’ songs in folklore depicted in 
patriotic lubok format, related the events of the war and the operations of 
the forces. The song, “From over the forest...” intoned, “As we reach the 
Berlin town there will be not even a trace of Germans left. We will come 
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back to our home forests, leading Wilhelm home by his whiskers!” [Сол-
датские военные песни, с. 25]. At the same time even in these patriotic 
songs, some of which were written by soldiers in lower ranks, there can be 
found direct and indirect acknowledgment of the enemy’s strength: “The 
enemy is strong, crafty, it’s not your Chinese bandit – If you drop a clanger, 
boy, − You’ll be in trouble” [Там же, с. 41], or “A German is scary to look at, 
but a Russian’s stronger” [Там же, с. 11]. 
Soldiers’ poems and songs drew a satirical image of Wilhelm and his 
soldiers. The latter were depicted as deceitful, greedy, proud, thieving, 
pillaging, violent against peaceful people, and prone to commit other sins 
[Там же, с. 32–35]. For instance, in “Wilhelm’s Song”, the kaiser admits, 
“My soldiers are very good, – there are no better in the world, – It’s just 
they are thieves and quick to pillage” [Там же, с. 34]. It is interesting that in 
the “Cossacks’ Song” there are lines confirming the stereotype of the beer-
loving German, which was originally spread by official propaganda. The 
author of the song addresses the German enemy: “Get a move on, red ears! 
This, brother, isn’t beer!” [Там же, с. 10].
Soldiers and peasants did not have clear ideas of the reality of Russia’s 
foreign politics at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries and, in many respects, 
preserved the archaic perception of a foreign aggressor as “un-Christian”4. 
F. Stepun, a philosopher who served as an ensign gunner during the war, 
stated that often peasant soldiers did not know the religion of the enemy 
and were frequently bewildered to find they were Christian, as it did not fit 
their idea of an “un-Christian”, “heathen” enemy [Степун, с. 270]. 
Aspects of traditional perceptions in the new conscripts made it difficult 
for them to be swayed effectively, firstly by officially declared objectives of the 
war and secondly by characteristics of the enemy articulated in the language 
of educated classes. It is hard to agree with V. P. Buldakov who writes that 
soldiers received no explanation of Russia’s objectives in the war from either 
officers or clergy [Булдаков, 1997, с. 29]. When explaining war objectives, is-
sued in orders from military command, the enemy’s traits and characteristics 
were read out to the soldiers. For instance, Order № 1 from the Commander 
in Chief of the Northwest Front, General Ya. G. Zhilinsky, dated 20 July 
(2 August) 1914, stated: “We must defend our motherland and the honour of 
our arms. It is not the first time our troops are fighting the Germans. They 
have tested us in combat in 1757 and 1812, and we have always prevailed. 
I am convinced that the regiments entrusted to me will demonstrate their 
natural valour in this war and as always will fulfil their duty honestly and 
selflessly” [Сенявская, 2006, с. 65]. The order for the 2nd Army dated 4 June 
1915 states: “In this war against the Germans, the age-old enemy of the Slavs, 
we are fighting to protect the greatest thing we have ever been entrusted to 
protect: the honour and integrity of Great Russia” [Там же]. 
A. I. Denikin stated that officers avoided explaining the war’s causes and 
objectives to the soldiers, either out of fear of reprisals or in order to follow 
4  On the Russian archetype of a foreign aggressor see [Чудинов, с. 359–361].
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the Imperial Decree issued just before the war, which prohibited military 
officials from having any conversations on contemporary political subjects, 
including foreign politics. However, he also admitted to having violated this 
decree, as did many others [Деникин, с. 98]. Primary sources demonstrate 
how the officers failed to successfully explain objectives, partly due to the 
lack of conceptual framing for the peasants, keeping them from “capturing” 
the arguments presented by educated officers [Степун, с. 270–271; Бру-
силов, с. 71–72; Оськин, с. 73]. Clergy in their explanations of the causes 
and characteristics of the war were unable to avoid a religious interpretative 
framework, reiterating appeals to serve God and tsar, “to bravely go to 
battle for tsar, sacred Russia, and Orthodox Christian faith” [Мезенцев, 
с.  72]. They emphasized in their explanations how violence against the 
enemy was permissible, even though such statements contradicted the 
commandments: “thou shalt not kill” and “love thy enemy”. 
Sometimes the officers’ and clergy’s propaganda appealed to popular 
experience, situations and images familiar to peasants. According to 
memoirs of the soldier, D. Oskin, Colonel of the 11th Tula Regiment Muzeus, 
in his address to the soldiers, he says: “German dominance has been so 
strong until now that we had almost no estate in which the manager was 
not a German causing serious problems for the people” [Оськин, с. 75]. 
This kind of propaganda was superimposed upon and processed with the 
peasant soldiers’ traditional distrust and animosity towards officials and 
wealthy upper classes, amongst whom were counted many ethnic Germans. 
A good example of such processing would be a typical explanation of the 
causes of the war, widespread among the soldiers between 1914–1915, 
related in the memoirs of the World War I private, A. Pireyko. According 
to his account, the Germans are the main perpetrators of the war, “having 
come to Russia taking the best positions at factories, plants, and even in the 
army because the Tsarina is German. However, this was not enough for the 
Germans, and they started the war to prevail over Russia and to take total 
possession over the country” [Пиренко, с. 35]. 
Dehumanizing trends in the development of technology manifested 
devastatingly during World War I. Weapons of mass destruction aimed at 
the total annihilation of the enemy had been used for the first time in hu-
man history. For instance, the German army used poisonous gas against 
the Russians on December 26th 1914 [Документы о немецких зверствах, 
с. 42]. In doing so, they violated international rules and conventions, since 
such brutal weapons were banned by international treaties (the Hague Con-
ventions of 1899 and 1907 etc.) from the first days of the war. This resulted 
in a wave of anti-German attitudes both on the frontlines and the rear. In 
the “Black Book of German Atrocities”, published in Petrograd in 1914, the 
following passage appeared: “Bearers of the German spirit... have fallen to 
the state of robber, savage, and rapist of women, torturer of children and 
old people. These people have no altar; the spirit has left them, and there are 
no cannons capable of protecting them from disintegration; they’ll drown 
in tears and blood of innocents; they declared their own condemnation. 
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Feelings of vengeance are alien to us, Russians, but it is our duty and our 
obligation to mete the just punishment for the evil deeds committed by the 
Germans” [Черная Книга германских зверств, с. 3]. The subject of Ger-
man atrocities and cruelty appeared frequently in the press. The Moscow 
Gazette, for instance, in the header, “Topics of the Day”, published numer-
ous witness statements of cruelty demonstrated by the German enemy and 
drew the following conclusion: “The conduct of these despicable people can 
be clearly and succinctly defined by two words: beastliness and skuldug-
gery” [Московские ведомости, 1914, № 232].
The majority of soldiers did not read periodicals being content with 
lubok pictures, which not only reaffirmed their first-hand experience of the 
enemy’s cruelty but also reinforced their general perceptions of the Ger-
mans. One such example is described in the campaign diary of Dr. L. Voy-
tololvsky, an army physician. He witnesses the following episode in August 
1915: “The clear sky is swarming with German airplanes. There are lots of 
them. They are dropping bombs that explode all over the place and fill the 
air with piercing metallic racket. Next to us there are Cossacks of the Yeka-
terinburg regiment taking a rest. Lounging on the grass they are looking at 
the flying machines with scorn and engaged in a calm discourse.
‘For sending these airplanes’, says the massive tanned guy, ‘we should 
break all the ribs of these Germans, and that’s being too kind...’
‘There are no dirtbags worse than the Germans’, the other responds, 
‘they thought of everything for killing. Gas, airplanes, cannons...’
‘The war has taught everybody’, an elderly Cossack joins with a sigh, 
‘No shame, no conscience. We mow down people as if they were meadow 
grass...’
‘That’s what I’m saying’, responds the first Cossack, ‘One climbs up there 
and ... drops bombs like turds. Another spits at him with shrapnel. What 
for? Who needs this? Only the devil knows!..’ [Войтоловский, с. 383].
Due to ineffective management, lack of the coordination between 
different parts of the state, shortages of arms and ammunition and battles 
lost on the frontlines, as early as the first year of the war, rumours circulated 
among soldiers of treason in the top echelons of power, of German spies 
and “German domination”. According to L. Voytolovsky, in August 1914 
soldiers, knowing neither the name of the regiment commander nor the 
regiment to which they were attached, had been passing around trusted 
statements in conversations like the following: “You see what cunning thing! 
The regiment commander is a German, defected to their side. That’s why 
they march us back and forth until we’re exhausted, torturing us, driving 
the last bits of strength out...” [Там же, с. 9]. 
The word nemets (a German) was gradually becoming a symbol, 
a verbal construct, which in 1915–1917 had a meaning in the common 
soldiers’ perception not only of an external enemy but the enemy’s internal 
accomplices, who hindered Russia’s effective performance at the front and 
mobilisation at rear. The nationalist propaganda in literature and periodicals 
associated German dominance with a soulless bureaucrat, the German 
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coloniser, a manager of a factory or an estate [Немецкое зло, с. 3−103; 
Московские ведомости, № 233]. This representation of the enemy started 
to be associated with the image of the empress, an ethnic German, after the 
“great retreat” of the Russian army in 1915. In the eyes of some peasants and 
soldiers, the Empress Alexandra Feodorovna and the Dowager Empress 
Maria Feodorovna had been “German ladies” allegedly sympathising with 
Germany, using all possible means to harm Russia. This is corroborated 
by the criminal files from the 1st Department of the 3rd Criminal Section 
of the Ministry of Justice on prosecutions for obscenities uttered about 
the tsar and the members of the royal family. For instance a private of 
the 345th Pskov Infantry Brigade, a peasant from the Pskov Guberniya, 
A. S. Zatravkin, a day before being conscripted in December 1914 in the 
village of B. Zagorye, while in conversation with girls who were knitting for 
the Russian army, said the following: “Напрасно вы, девушки, работаете 
для армии, бросьте работу, все равно вещи ваши не дойдут ни до сол-
дата, ни до бедного офицерика, и злая Царица матерь Государя импе-
ратора Мария Федоровна все ваши вещи прокутит и прогуляет со сво-
ими любовниками и развратниками”5 [РГИА, ф. 1405, оп. 521, д. 476, 
л. 3 об.]. Other sources reinforce such perceptions in the army. F. Stepun 
wrote that in 1916, “in the trenches soldiers talked openly saying that the 
war was sent onto Russia by the German advisors of the Sovereign Emperor 
having great power at the Court being backed by the very Empress who, 
although married to a Russian man, still toes the German line” [Степун, 
с. 301]. There were rumours among soldiers about treason committed by 
brigade, division, and regiment commanders as well as fort commandants, 
some who had German surnames [РГВИА, ф. 2048, оп. 1, д. 904, л. 9; Боч-
карева, c. 152–153]. Poor military management, embezzlement, and the 
cowardice of certain officers were often attributed to treason too. Sometimes 
soldiers would blame German dominance for the harsh discipline in the 
army. One of the soldier’s letters, dated November 1915, states: “У нас в 
пехоте введена жестокая порка за всякий маловажный проступок 
солдата… А это есть плод немецких козней и измышления”6 [РГВИА]. 
The perceived stereotype of the German enemy, who had always been 
beaten by the Russians, was soon dispelled on the battlefield where the Rus-
sian army experienced the full weight of the German “armoured fist”. Hav-
ing personally experienced the deadly force of German military weaponry, 
especially at the time of shortages of the most basic arms, heavy artillery, 
munitions, rifles, and cartridges between 1914–1915, Russian soldiers suf-
fered a serious psychological shock. In contrast to the caricatural image rep-
resented by propaganda, soldiers came face to face with the German, who 
in their eyes was a capable adversary, with nearly superhuman attributes, 
5  “You, girls, are working for the army in vain, give it up, the things you make will never 
get to soldiers or poor officers and the evil Tsarina, Mother of the Sovereign Emperor Maria 
Feodorovna will waste all these things bingeing with her reprobate women-chasing lovers”.
6  “In the infantry they introduced barbaric beatings for any minor offence a soldier is 
found guilty of... And this is the fruit of German machinations and fabrications”.
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possessing an impressive mind, will, and even magical abilities, which were 
unattainable to the Russians. S. Z. Fedorchenko, a nurse who had kept 
records of soldiers’ conversations7, witnessed a discourse on this subject, 
demonstrating the strength and profoundness of this psychological phe-
nomena: “A German’s head is like clockwork. Oil it well, and it’ll work just 
lovely, no bother. And us?... First of all we get beatings, lots of ‘em. To this 
day when I sleep all I see is beatings”; “Everyone is giving praise to the Ger-
mans now. We reckon now that a German and a wise man are one and the 
same thing.... It all started with us being stupid.... As the saying goes, he is a 
brave man amongst sheep, but a sheep when set against a brave man”; “The 
Germans know this very well. Everything works out with them, not like 
us. There are no faults in their clothes, drink, food, or arms wherever you 
look... And what is it that they have? Maybe we could find it, but we were 
not given an order to do it” [Федорченко, с. 84, 88–90]. 
These sentiments reflect perceptions of the adversary’s superiority, and 
similar verbal constructs were reported by L. N. Voytolovsky, who recorded 
the following conversation in October 1914: 
“So, do you think we will prevail over the Germans?” the adjutant asks. 
“Well... we should”, says the stubbly infantry private without conviction. “It’s 
just, you see, they have so many cannons. When they start blanket bombing 
with shrapnel, you can’t see the sky... “You can’t prevail over the Germans 
with just a straw. See the training they get, and us?... War or no war Ger-
mans are taught everything from a young age and know what’s what and 
how. Their clothes, and food, and cannons are all different from ours. Eve-
rything works out with them, not like us!... No! The Germans won’t lose!” 
[Войтоловский, с. 74]. “How could we fight the Germans? No way – their 
soldiers are well fed, shod, clothed, and washed, and soldiers have good 
thoughts. What do WE have? No order, they are just tiring the people for 
no good reason” [Арамилев, с. 539].
Data from other sources confirm that these perceptions were not rare. 
A content analysis of letters intercepted by the Military Censor Committee 
of the Kazan Military District from 1915 to early 19178 demonstrate that 
these types of statements took third highest position of the most frequently 
recited criticism in soldiers’ letters from 1915. This category of statements 
includes firstly, assertions of the superiority of the German military and 
technology and secondly, assertions of treachery and corruption in the top 
military command and in governmental officials, either who were bribed 
allegedly by the Germans (particularly those who sold Russian lands to the 
Germans) or who were ethnic Germans, which, according to the authors of 
these letters, caused the Russian army to lose the war (9.8 % each) [Порш-
нева, с. 195–196]. In 1916 there was a significant increase (from 1.6 % in 
1915 to 4  %) of the share of statements that Russia cannot win the war 
7  We share the opinion of a number of authors on authenticity of these records. See: 
[Поршнева, с. 308–324].
8  Dangerous letters attached to censors’ reports are published in the collection [Царская 
армия в период мировой войны и Февральской революции, с. 24–160].
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against Germany. Moreover, 3.6 % of this category of statements insisted 
that the enemy was not outside, but inside the country [Там же, с. 209].
Belief in German military and technical superiority was typical for the 
officer ranks in the Russian army. The Head of the British Military Mission, 
General A. Knox, wrote the following in August 1915: “You cannot but be 
amazed at how many outstanding commanders are so mortified by the 
conviction of the technical superiority of the Germans; they believe that 
Germans ‘can do anything’” [цит. по: Головин, т. 2, с. 142]. Perceptions of 
German military power conversely reflected back upon a lack of confidence 
in their own weaponry. This confidence or the lack of it is one of the 
factors determining the army’s state of morale. P. I. Izmestyev, a military 
psychologist, admitted: “We had no confidence in ourselves, in our own 
weaponry, being mesmerized by the power of the Germans” [Изместьев, 
с. 9]. 
As the war continued, the tendency of “humanizing” the image of the 
German became more pronounced in soldiers’ minds, moving away from 
stereotypes imposed by official propaganda and cultural traditions. This 
change occurred because of the common situations experienced by pri-
vates, who served on both sides, especially as they came into direct con-
tact with each other, in the beginning either in hand-to-hand combat, as 
POWs, or as wounded enemy soldiers who received care and attention, and 
later during periods of mutual visits to the trenches on Christian holidays 
or general fraternization, etc. Particularly influential on attitudes towards 
the enemy was the effect of fraternization, which occurred for the first 
time during Christmas 1915–1916, Christmas 1916–1917, and also Easter 
1916, when soldiers exchanged food, gifts, and visited each other’s trenches 
[Солдатские письма в годы мировой войны, с. 148–155]. Russian sol-
diers were impressed by the tidiness and comfort of German trenches. 
German provisions and alcoholic beverages appeared to be of better qual-
ity, which only served to reinforce their belief in the material and techni-
cal superiority of the enemy. The press published first-hand accounts of 
journalists who visited hospitals: “The Russian wounded speak of German 
POWs without hatred. You always hear: ‘They are people, the same as us’” 
[Петроградские ведомости].
The common soldiers’ consciousness underwent the intensive process of 
focusing perceptions of evil onto the figure of the inner enemy while at the 
same time “humanizing” the image of the external enemy. The following 
soldier’s reasoning was typical in letters of criticism intercepted by censors: 
“Did we come here so that our homes are ravaged? No, nobody ever thought 
that; We went hoping to protect the fatherland against the external enemy 
and forgot about the inner enemy, but he is not far removed” [Царская 
армия в период мировой войны и Февральской революции, с. 119], 
“There are no German or Turkish beasts; they are people, the same as us; 
their wives, mothers, fathers suffer just as much as you. They were sent to 
fight by the fat masters and officer bosses. They are the ones who need the 
war, not us” [Там же, с. 81].
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The broadening of soldiers’ horizons affected the perception of the 
external German enemy; some of them, particularly workers, had read 
socialist literature prior to the war. Legal left-liberal papers published during 
the war argued that simple German folk were not to blame for the initiation 
of the military conflict [Зауральский край]. A gradual transformation of 
the image of the external enemy as “beast” to the image of the enemy as 
human occurred. This was corroborated indirectly by the decline of the 
satirical genre of lubok, the genre used earlier to dehumanize the enemy, 
which by 1915 had stopped being published [Hubertus, р.  25]. Many 
testimonies of such attitudes can be found in memoirs, which recorded 
typical soldiers’ thoughts and reflections. S. Z. Fedorchenko quoted the 
following monologue: “His bosses sent him here, like us. Tore him away 
from everything. Where’s the wife? Where’s the house? Where’s his mother? 
Us and them are both without guilt. It is even harder for him; they say their 
homes are very nice. Hard to leave” [Федорченко, с. 81]. The campaign 
diary of L. Voytolovsky records a similar statement: “German did me no 
harm... and there’s no point in fighting” [Войтоловский, с. 74].
The crisis of confidence in the government and the course of the war itself 
changed the attitude of Russian soldiers towards their allies, driving them to 
further disappointment. There was a widespread perception of Great Britain 
as the main culprit in the war and the key enemy of the Russian people, which 
also had been reinforced by German propaganda as it aimed at the systematic 
corruption of morale in Russian troops. Regardless of the increase in anti-
German attitudes in Russian society from 1916 to 1917, and then a temporary 
revival of the military enthusiasm during the February Revolution in 1917, 
this trend of the inversion of the image of the external enemy had manifested 
with an immense force with the development of the events in spring-autumn 
of 1917, when it was not Germany / the Germans but England / the English 
and other allies as well as the bourgeoisie which had turned into the enemies 
of the Russian people in the perception of the Russian soldier. 
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